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ROBERT A. SEDLER*

Professor Sedler urges resolution of choice-of-law problems arising from multistate incidents on the basis of "real"
ratherthan "hypothetical" interests of the states involved. He
would thus make a detailed analysis of each case to determine
which present "real" as opposed to "false" conflicts. On discovering a "real" conflict, Professor Sedler would apply the
forum state's law unless it would work an injustice to the
parties.
My approach to the solution of conflicts problems,' while to a
large extent based upon interest analysis as propounded by Professoi
Brainerd Currie, also relates to judicial method and the case-by-case
development of a body of conflicts law by the courts. It is my position
that courts should make decisions on the displacement of the forum's
law with reference to the fact-law pattern of particular cases, and that
the forum's law should be displaced only when its application would
defeat the legitimate expectations of the parties or would be violative
of the interests of other states, which, under the circumstances, the
forum should recognize. You will note the similarity between this approach and what Professor Cavers was proposing in his classic article,
A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem.2 You may also note the
similarity between my approach and Professor Albert Ehrenzweig's
"true rule."
My application of interest analysis has taken a somewhat different
direction from that of Professor Brainerd Currie, and this difference

becomes very significant in determining what is a "true conflict." The
conflicts field changes so rapidly that it may be appropriate to refer
to "traditional interest analysis" as developed by Professor Currie.
It seems to me that when Professor Currie applied interest analysis
he did so in terms of possible, or what I call hypothetical, interest;
that is, considering the purpose or policy behind the differing laws,
could one or more states have any legitimate interest in the application
of its law to the issue in question. The matter of what constituted a
true conflict likewise was approached with reference to this possible
or hypothetical interest. While Professor Currie recognized that some* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. BA., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
I See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27 (1967); Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the
Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in JudicialMethod,
2 RuTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 8 (1970).
2 Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 R-Mv. L. Rz. 173 (1938).
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times an apparent conflict could be avoided by a more moderate and
restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state, he also
stoutly insisted that in the case of a true conflict, as he defined it,
a court could not weigh conflicting interests and, therefore, in such a
case the forum had to apply its own law.
It is this analysis in terms of hypothetical interest that marks my
point of departure from Professor Currie. I believe it is possible by a
careful analysis of the practical realities of a given situation to assess
the real interests of the states involved. Thus I see a true conflict only
when more than one state has a real interest in the application of its
law to a particular issue. When one state has a real interest and the
interest of the other state is only hypothetical, the conflict, in my view,
is "readily avoidable," and I would apply the law of the state with
the real interest. I do not think this is a weighing of interests-I prefer
to call it a qualitative analysis of those interests-and perhaps it is an
extension of Professor Currie's concept of a more moderate and restrained interpretation. In any event, I would find a true conflict when
more than one state has a real interest, and in such a case I do follow
Professor Currie's view that the forum should apply its own law. Of
course under my definition of interest, true conflicts will occur with
less frequency than under Professor Currie's.
It is Case I of Professor Cavers' three hypotheticals3 that, in my
opinion, best illustrates the difference between hypothetical and real
interests. The policy of State X is to limit the liability of tortfeasors,
particularly in death actions, as evidenced by the ceiling on recovery
and the restrictive application of res ipsa loquiturto airplane accidents.
It clearly has an interest in applying that policy to protect an X
corporation being sued by the survivors of an X decedent. The interest
of State Z in applying its law to allow recovery to Mrs. P is purely
hypothetical and does not accord with the realities of modern life.
Professor Currie's "medical creditors" and "public charge" argument
would, or course, be inapplicable in this death case, but I would say
the same thing if P had lived and the issue was whether X or Z law
should apply on the question of res ipsa. Today the injured plaintiff
will get back home-unlike the situation perhaps prevailing at the
time of Pacific Employers4 and Alaska Packers5 -and the social and
economic consequences of the accident will be borne by his home
state. Also, the purpose of allowing tort recovery is not to benefit
3 For a full statement of Case I see Appendix.
4 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 US. 493 (1939).
5 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 US. 532 (1935).
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medical creditors; this is a very attenuated basis for finding any interest.
Now I come to the premise on which Professor Cavers' first principle of preference 6 is based, that the state where an injury occurs has
an interest in extending the protection of its law allowing recovery
to a nonresident injured there. This interest is necessarily a theoretical
one except when liability is imposed for admonitory purposes and the
wrongful act as well as the injury occurred in that state. But in the
ordinary accident case, the realistic purpose in allowing recovery is to
provide compensation for the victim or his dependents. Since the
social and economic consequences of the accident will be borne in
the victim's home state, the only real interest in allowing compensation
lies there.
The justification given for application of the law of the state of
injury proceeds on the assumption that there is an interest precisely
because the person was injured there and that to deny recovery would
impair the "system of physical and financial protection" established by
that state. But as a practical matter, to deny recovery to a nonresident
will not have any effect on that system. Since the victim and his dependents are not living there and the social and economic consequences of
the accident will not be felt there, I simply do not see any real interest
on the part of the state of injury in applying its law to allow recovery.
Thus, under my interpretation of interest analysis, the only interested state in Case I is State X; I, therefore, do not believe this case
presents a true conflict. State X should apply its law on both the question of res ipsa and the question of the wrongful death ceiling, and
if the suit could be brought in State Z under its long-arm statute, I
would say that Z should also apply X law. In other words, I agree with
the result in a case such as Johnson v. Johnson" and would disagree
with the results in Kell v. Henderson8 and the Wisconsin case of
Conklin v. Homer.9 Extending this principle, I would say that whenever two parties from an immunity, no liability, or limited liability
state are involved in an accident in a "recovery" state-assuming no
interest of the recovery state in implementing any admonitory policy
-there is, in reality, a false conflict and the law of the parties' home
state should be applied.
6 D. CAvR~s, Ti CHOICE-oF-LAW PROcESS 139 (1965).
7 107 N.H. 30, 216 A2d 781 (1966).
8 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), af'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S2d
552 (1966).
9 58 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
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It may seem that I am advocating a "personal law" of torts even
to the point when this results in a denial of recovery. This is not
strictly true, but the charge does not bother me because, in this day of
the jet airplane and the interstate highway, I cannot attach much
significance to the place where an accident occurs.
If you look at the cases that actually arise-and obviously this is
the focal point of my concern-they usually involve two residents of
the same state traveling in the same vehicle in another state (all the
guest-statute and family-immunity cases fall into this category) or they
involve two residents of the same state who collide in a neighboring
state in which there is a frequent pattern of interstate travel. Cases
such as Grant v. McAuliffe ° and Mitchell v. Craft," and for these
purposes, Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 2 come readily to mind.
I would emphasize again that, in my view, the approach to the
solution of choice-of-law problems should be based on these kinds of
cases-the kind that actually arise-rather than on the possibility of
two New York residents colliding in Timbuctu or somewhere else.
Case II,23 as Professor Cavers points out, is a false conflict. State Y
has a real interest in applying its admonitory policy against a Y defendant who leaves his keys in a parked automobile in Y. No interest of
State X is invaded if Y allows recovery against the Y defendant in favor
of an X plaintiff injured in X. The more interesting case is the one
in which the defendant is a resident of X, which is not an improbable
situation. Here Y's interest in implementing its admonitory policy
conflicts with X's interest in protecting its resident and his insurer
from what it considers an unwarranted extension of liability. Both
states have a real interest, and I should have to say that here each state
should apply its own law. This troubles me a bit when it results in X's
applying its law. There seems to be considerable validity to Professor
Cavers' third principle of preference,' 4 and I can see the argument
to the effect that X should respect the admonitory policy of Y when
the unlawful act occurred in Y. I cannot, however, worry about this
too much because the case is not likely to arise in that posture. P will
sue in State Y, obtaining jurisdiction under Y's long-arm act, which
would doubtless be interpreted to authorize suit against a nonresident
who left his keys in a parked vehicle in Y. Y, applying its own law
in this case of a true conflict, will allow recovery.
10 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
11211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
12 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
13 For a full statement of Case II see Appendix.

14 See Cavers, supra note 6, at 159.
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Since Case 11115 involves the validity of a contract, I want to say
briefly something about interest analysis in that context. All states
share a common policy of protecting the legitimate expectations of
the parties to consensual arrangements and of promoting the stability
of commercial transactions. The interest in implementing this common
policy may be more important than the interest of a state in applying
its specific rules of contract law. This is particularly so when the rule
in question does not reflect any strong policy. Many rules of substantive
contract law, such as a rule that a contract by mail is accepted upon
posting, are designed primarily to implement the broader policy of
protecting expectations and insuring commercial stability. This would
indicate that interest analysis may be less significant here, or at least
that it must be approached from a different perspective.
Of course, in the hypothetical case we are dealing with a rule that
does represent a strong contractual policy and, in my view, Professor
Cavers' solution is based primarily on the interest of State X in applying its Statute of Frauds to a transaction centered in that state; I agree
with the result. The stability of commercial transactions in Z and Y
is not weakened by X's holding an X broker to X standards when so
many of the significant events took place in X. It should be noted that
here interest analysis results in the protection of a nonresident against
a resident of the forum, and because the transaction was centered in X,
X has a real interest in extending this protection to him.
15 For a full statement of Case III see Appendix.

